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Abstract
Much of the recent neuropsychological literature on false beliefs (delusions) has tended to focus on individual or single
beliefs, with few studies actually investigating the relationship or co-occurrence between different types of co-existing
beliefs. Quine and Ullian proposed the hypothesis that our beliefs form an interconnected web in which the beliefs that
make up that system must somehow ‘‘cohere’’ with one another and avoid cognitive dissonance. As such beliefs are unlikely
to be encapsulated (i.e., exist in isolation from other beliefs). The aim of this preliminary study was to empirically evaluate
the probability of belief co-occurrence as one indicator of coherence in a large sample of subjects involving three different
thematic sets of beliefs (delusion-like, paranormal & religious, and societal/cultural). Results showed that the degree of belief
co-endorsement between beliefs within thematic groupings was greater than random occurrence, lending support to
Quine and Ullian’s coherentist account. Some associations, however, were relatively weak, providing for well-established
examples of cognitive dissonance.
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Introduction
Although the formal study of beliefs has received comparatively
little interest from the cognitive neurosciences [1], the study of
false beliefs (delusions) has proved a productive field over the past
decade when explaining delusions in terms of impairments to
cognitive processes [2,3]. For the most part, these studies have
focused on highly specific, monothematic problematic beliefs
related to misidentification and body awareness [4]. However,
patients and controls claim to hold many different types of beliefs
with different degrees of intensity and few studies to date have
looked at the internal consistency and interrelationships between
such beliefs.
This is surprising given Festinger’s influential premise outlined
in 1957 [5], which proposed that as human beings we are
motivated to achieve consonance (i.e. agreement) and reduce or
avoid cognitive dissonance by filtering new beliefs through pre-
existing schema to ensure consistency [6,7]. Consequently ‘‘a
proposition is believed (empowered to guide behaviour) when the
proposition’s meaning is represented, coded or symbolized in a
mental system’’ [8], with meaning having been defined as the
coherence between beliefs and without which our actions ‘‘would
be random and disconnected from our surroundings’’ [9].
Characterising this relationship between beliefs as an episte-
mological metaphor, maximizing coherence, Quine and Ullian
[10] proposed the existence of a ‘web of beliefs’ as a necessary
condition for beliefs to be meaningful, as well as an important
process for the acceptance, rejection and integration of new
beliefs. As such, the ‘‘web’’ metaphor provides a collective
explanatory network, where changes in one part afford and
impact changes elsewhere. Many contemporary philosophers
favour coherence theories of knowledge [11]. Davidson [12,13]
argued that beliefs can only be understood by relating them to
a background of other beliefs and desires. Fodor [14] also
considered beliefs to be related to and justified by reference to
other propositions. In social psychology, belief networks are
considered central to many theories in the psychology of
attitudes [15]. According to the coherence theory of truth, a
proposition coheres with a set of propositions if it is entailed by
other members of the set [16].
These ideas were further developed by Thagard [11], who
considered a belief to be justified ‘‘not because it is indubitable or
is derived from some other indubitable beliefs, but because it
coheres with other beliefs that jointly support each other’’ (p.5).
Thagard accounted for coherence in terms of constraint satisfac-
tion, extending discussion of coherence to a much wider range of
cognitions, including perception and decision-making [11]. In this
manner, a mental representation such as a belief could either
cohere (i.e. have a positive constraint) or not cohere (i.e. have a
negative constraint) with other representations. Coherence was
maximised by accepting or not accepting beliefs so as to satisfy the
most constraints (both positive and negative). In this way, Thagard
also left room for some incoherence between beliefs (unlike the
philosophical argument of Quine and Ullian).
Problems arising from holding different beliefs can result in
internal conflict or cognitive dissonance, a term coined by
Festinger [5] to capture the discrepancy between active beliefs
and the overriding drive for meaningful coherence. Festinger [5]
proposed that people are motivated to avoid such cognitive
dissonance (i.e. holding contradictory beliefs, thoughts, attitudes,
etc). As such, belief coherence requires (in part) subjects having
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some awareness of the beliefs held and their potential for
inconsistency. In the clinical literature, there are examples of
somatoparaphrenia [17,18], where probing the phenomenal
condition (e.g., supernumerary phantom limb) helps reveal an
uncomfortable awareness of contradictory claims. Dysfunctional
belief evaluation and revision has been proposed to play a key role
in the maintenance of delusions [4], and interestingly, such a
deficit may be quite selective, with parts of the belief system
unaffected [19]. However, whether long-term cognitive dissonance
presents in the general population is unknown.
Exploration of belief coherence could provide a novel way of
extending current deficit models of belief (e.g. delusions) by
elucidating the effects of aberrant beliefs on the coherence (or not)
between other beliefs. A cognitive neuropsychiatric approach
suggests that unusual beliefs such as delusions can be best
explained by understanding the normal processes by which beliefs
are formed and subsequently perturbed. The exact nature of the
deficit(s) that give rise to delusional beliefs is not known, nor is the
framework or context in which such beliefs develop. One potential
candidate factor that could be predicted to selectively compromise
belief, is the coherence between belief relationships. A clinically
relevant or salient delusion (e.g., Capgras) might for example
‘‘infect’’, ‘‘predispose’’ and/or subjugate a cohort of existing
beliefs, or indeed provide for new content-dependent secondary
delusions (e.g., paranoia).
Despite contemporary philosophy favouring coherence theories
of belief [5,10,11,13] there is an absence of empirical studies. As
such, the approach remains largely theoretical and it is not clear
whether the ‘web’ metaphor actually provides a useful heuristic for
how similar beliefs might actually cohere in reality. Indeed, ‘‘the
nature of coherence is usually left vague, with no method provided
for determining whether a belief should be accepted or rejected on
the basis of its coherence or incoherence with other beliefs’’ [11:
p.41].
Although the concept of coherence remains ‘‘vague’’, a number
of authors have begun to define the construct in probabilistic terms
following the intuitive notion that coherent propositions should
‘‘hang together well’’ [20], and that coherence remains a matter of
degree [21]. As such, one might expect that groups of beliefs that
share certain characteristics may co-occur within individuals
responses to belief questions due to underlying coherence between
their sets of beliefs, e.g. beliefs in an afterlife may necessitate belief
in a spirit separate from the body. However, co-occurrence is not
the same as coherence: e.g. a belief in God may co-occur with
beliefs in communication with the dead due to a common notion
related to beliefs in spirits, but lack of incoherence (rather than
coherence per se) might be also driving this co-occurrence.
Nevertheless, the degree to which beliefs co-occur more than
expected on the basis individual levels of endorsement provides
one quantifiable indicator of underlying coherence between
beliefs. In this paper co-occurrence between endorsed beliefs are
used as a measurable form of association, the relative extent of
which may indicate the relative degree of coherence. Moreover,
the degree to which beliefs that would be expected to show very
high levels of coherence fail to show high co-occurrence is also
examined.
Preliminary support for co-occurrence between thematic groups
of beliefs was reported by Pechey and Halligan [22], who showed
that participants’ responses to items within a thematic category of
belief (delusion-like beliefs, paranormal and religious beliefs, or
societal/cultural beliefs) largely correlated highly with each other
(using Cronbach’s alpha) in a large sample of non-patient subjects.
Correlational analyses between categories, however, showed that
while different belief types (DLB and P&RB) were significantly
correlated, societal/cultural beliefs (SCB) were different and
largely unrelated.
The current study builds on these findings by:
(a) Exploring the range of co-endorsements for distinct belief
items (comprising the Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire [CBQ]),
by looking at specific belief pairs and the extent to which co-
endorsements of these occur more than would be predicted
given the levels of endorsement for each (i.e. investigating
whether holding a belief of a particular type increases the likelihood of
holding a belief of a similar type).
(b) Investigating the degree to which specific belief pairs,
designed to have similar content are not both endorsed by
individuals (i.e. investigating the extent to which members of
the general population report dissonance between beliefs)
In particular, it was hypothesised that: (i) beliefs within thematic
groups would more likely co-occur than those between groups; (ii)
beliefs within the thematic groups ‘delusion-like’ and ‘paranormal
and religious’ would show greater co-occurrences than those in the
‘societal/cultural’ group, given the less strong thematic associa-
tions within the latter group; (iii) that there would be greater co-
occurrence between ‘delusion-like’ and ‘paranormal and religious’
beliefs than between either group and ‘societal/cultural’ beliefs,
given the strong and reliable association between delusions and
paranormal beliefs [23–26] and finally (iv) the incidence of
dissonant beliefs reported by non-clinical participants would be
small.
Methods
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the Cardiff University School of
Psychology ethics committee. All participants of the telephone
interview gave verbal consent, in accordance with the protocol
approved by the ethics committee.
Participants
The responses of 1,000 adults (aged 18 years or over) were
examined. A stratified random sampling technique was used to
obtain a large sample from across Britain, with quotas set on
age, gender and employment status. Computer-assisted tele-
phone interviewing was carried out by an experienced market
research company (MRUK), using numbers generated by
random digit dialing. The number of refusals was not recorded,
so an overall response rate could not be reported. Telephone
interviews were chosen as being more conducive to frank
responses than face-to-face interviews. Of the participants,
19.4% were aged 18–29 years, 29.2% aged 30–44 years,
24.5% aged 45–59 years and 26.9% aged 60 years or over;
52.1% were female. Socioeconomic groups (using British
classifications according to occupation/prior occupation) were
AB (e.g., managers, administrators and professionals; 34.6%),
C1 (e.g., clerical workers, call centre agents, nursery nurses;
21.2%), C2 (technical and craft workers; 9.3%), DE (semi/
unskilled manual workers; 20.3%) and not classified (14.6%).
Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (CBQ)
This study reports the first detailed analysis of the probability of
co-endorsement for a large number of belief items (17 delusion-like
beliefs, 10 paranormal and religious beliefs, and 19 societal/
cultural beliefs). All items comprised the Cardiff Beliefs Question-
naire (CBQ), which was designed to detect delusion-like beliefs in
non-clinical samples. The CBQ avoids clinical vocabulary and
Using Co-Occurrence to Evaluate Belief Coherence
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 November 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 11 | e48446
locates questions within a broader non-clinically focused context,
in order to encourage participants to endorse items in an honest
and open manner. Respondents are offered 5 response options:
‘Do not believe’, ‘Don’t know’, ‘Weakly believe’, ‘Moderately
believe’, ‘Strongly believe’. The CBQ has good reliability and
validity [22].
Given that the choice of belief questions employed largely
determines the degree of expected association (coherence)
between beliefs, we describe briefly how the 3 sets of thematic
questions were selected. To avoid ambiguity and conscious of
time constraints, one question per sub theme was used.The set
of delusion-like beliefs was designed to sample across a range of
delusional themes, with one question representing each delu-
sional theme. DLB themes were taken from DSM-IV-TR [27],
existing clinical measures [28–31] and relevant examples from
the cognitive neuropsychological research literature [32–34].
Paranormal questions were based on reviews of published
market research polls [35–37] and paranormal belief measures
[38–40]. In contrast to the DLB category, within the P&RB
category, there were four belief pairings that were specifically
designed to have similar content, so as to investigate belief
dissonance (see Table 1 for these belief pairings). Finally the
societal and cultural questions were largely based on themes
from market research surveys, representing potentially contro-
versial or topical issues, and each item was selected indepen-
dently with the exception of one further pair of items designed
to investigate dissonance.
Analysis
The main analysis involved a group level assessment, with the
aim of providing an indication of the level or extent of co-
endorsement over and above those expected by chance for the
total subject sample (N= 1000). The number of times each belief
pair within the total set was co-endorsed was analysed using chi-
square tests (with Yates’s and Bonferroni’s corrections), taking into
account the levels of endorsement that each belief received
separately. The phi statistic was used as a measure of degree of
association. The degree to which co-occurrence was present or
absent between belief pairs expected to show strong coherence,
was examined. Mann-Whitney U tests were used to examine
demographic differences when reporting potentially dissonant
beliefs.
Results
1. Coherence between Beliefs
To examine the degree of coherence we considered levels of co-
endorsement between belief pairs within individuals using the total
sample of responses to the 46 CBQ questions. Although the
number of beliefs (mean= 17.6) endorsed ‘strongly believe’ or
‘moderately believe’ by subjects in the study as a whole varied (see
Figure 1), with males (M=17.2) endorsing less than females
(M=18.0), and younger people more than older (18–29
(M=18.3); 30–44 (M=18.0); 45–59 (M=18.0); 60+ (M=16.3),
there was no shortage of examples of extensive belief co-
endorsements.
Collectively the pattern of belief co-endorsements suggests that
while many beliefs are held involving each of the 3 content belief
groups, one participant reported holding only one belief (from the
SCB group) out of the 46 covered by the CBQ.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the significant belief pair associations
(all phi.0.1) for the three belief categories. The findings clearly
show that delusion-like and paranormal and religious beliefs have
much higher co-endorsements than would have been expected by
chance alone, and in particular, by comparison to societal/cultural
beliefs. Figure 5 shows the strongest of these associations (phi.0.2)
for all groups. In general, endorsement of any belief from DLB or
P&RB categories (see Figures 2 and 3) provides for a small/
moderate increase in the chances of an individual endorsing
another belief from that category (as every belief in those
categories was significantly associated with at least one other from
the same category). However, this was less true for SCB (see
Figure 4), where often there were no relationships between
endorsements within this heterogeneous belief type, and only one
belief pair showed an association of phi (w) $0.2 or more (a pair
specifically designed to have similar content: see Figure 4).
However, Figure 5 shows that strong associations also crossed
between belief categories, especially for paranormal and religious
and delusion-like beliefs. In particular, beliefs in reincarnation,
aliens visiting Earth, reduplicative paramnesia of both person and
place, and ideas of reference were strongly associated with other
beliefs including those from other categories.
2. Dissonance between Beliefs
Overall, 64.9% of the sample produced consistent belief
pairings. 35.1% of the sample produced inconsistent belief pairs:
25.8% of these holding one inconsistent belief pair, 7.7% holding
two, 1.6% three or more. Furthermore, 13.1% held strongly
Table 1. The percentage of selected belief pairs reported inconsistently.
Item A Item B
Percentage of those reporting
belief in item A but
not in item B
Percentage of those reporting
strong belief in item A but not in
item B
Reincarnation (i.e. that when you die your
soul is reborn in another body)
The soul or spirit survives death 41.6% (n = 159) 38.3% (n = 36)
Some people communicate with the dead The soul or spirit survives death 22.6% (n = 91) 21.5% (n = 34)
Earth has been visited by aliens from other
solar systems
Extra-terrestrial life 12.4% (n = 43) 8.3% (n = 5)
Some people are possessed by evil spirits Demons or evil spirits 9.4% (n = 38) 4.2% (n = 4)
The theory of evolution Humans share a common
ancestor with apes
8% (n = 67) 5.6% (n = 26)
Humans share a common ancestor
with apes
The theory of evolution 7.7% (n = 64) 4.3% (n = 22)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048446.t001
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inconsistent belief pairs: 11.1% held one inconsistent belief pair,
1.9% held two, and 0.1% three. Table 1 shows the results for
individual belief pairings, where the pairing ‘possession by evil
spirits’ and ‘demons or evil spirits’ appeared to be the most
inconsistent (42% of those endorsing possession not endorsing evil
spirits, with 38% still doing so when endorsing possession strongly).
3. Demographics
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests were used to explore
the contribution of demographic variables (Age; Gender; Socio-
economic group; Education; Ethnicity; Religion) to the findings
described above for the 5 pairs of beliefs. Significant associations
(at p#0.0001) with the number of inconsistent beliefs were found
with older age (x2(3) = 28.59) and lower education (x2(2) = 20.14).
Age. Older participants (aged 60+) endorsed significantly
more inconsistent belief pairs than those who were younger (aged
18–29 (U(194,269) = 20855.5) or aged 30–44
(U(292,269) = 31723.0)), and there was also a trend towards the
60+ age group having more inconsistent belief pairs than those
Figure 1. The number of strong/moderate beliefs reported (n=1000).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048446.g001
Figure 2. The delusion-like belief pairs with associations of phi (w) $0.1. (RP: Reduplicative paramnesia).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048446.g002
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aged 45–59 (U(245,269) = 27779.0, p = 0.0004). No other age
group comparisons were significant.
Education. Participants whose highest educational qualifica-
tion was secondary level showed more inconsistent belief
endorsements than those with university qualifications
(U(551,274) = 64551.0). However, the comparison between those
with a secondary level qualification and those with a higher
qualification failed to reach significance; U(551,68) = 15674.0,
p = 0.010).
4. Discussion
Albeit preliminary, this is the only study that we are aware of
that attempts to capture the extent of coherence (or incoherence)
between beliefs. As predicted, beliefs within thematic groups were
more likely to co-occur more than expected by chance than those
between groups. The findings also support previous results [22],
indicating that the belief groups with delusion-like, paranormal
and religious content comprised items that were more likely to co-
Figure 3. The paranormal and religious belief pairs with associations of phi (w) $0.1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048446.g003
Figure 4. The societal/cultural belief pairs with associations of phi (w) $0.1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048446.g004
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occur together, predicted given the strong and reliable association
between delusions and paranormal beliefs [23–26]. Societal/
cultural belief items predictably showed less association with beliefs
from the other groups.
Moreover, delusion-like and paranormal and religious beliefs
showed more co-occurrences within group than those in the
‘societal/cultural’ group, given the less strong thematic associa-
tions within the latter group. Furthermore, this approach allowed
for the identification of belief pairs with the strongest associations
(with phi.0.3: reduplicative paramnesia of person and of place;
possession by evil spirits with demons/evil spirits; possession by
evil spirits with magic; extraterrestrial life and aliens having visited
Earth), revealing links between those beliefs that might be
expected to co-occur.
Contrary to expectations, a larger proportion of individuals
reported inconsistent belief pairings although this fell to only 13%
when looking at reports of strong beliefs. Interestingly, paranormal
belief pairing tended to be more inconsistent than the societal/
cultural pair (evolution/sharing a common ancestor with apes).
This may be due to these pairs being less formally discussed or
fully articulated, with the results that subjects are less likely to be
aware of or address discrepancy. Indeed, belief coherence should
be stronger for those belief pairs that are more likely to be
considered ‘‘core’’ or salient beliefs, and need only hold for those
belief pairs where the holder is aware of and which are likely to be
those that are more frequently considered. It seems plausible that
people may have varying degrees of tolerance for inconsistent
beliefs, in particular given the dependence on awareness for one’s
beliefs. Indeed, some individuals showed considerable variation in
the patterns of belief endorsement. This may be one particularly
interesting area of further study when studying individuals with
delusional beliefs, to establish whether the degree to which they
report dissonant beliefs is different to non-clinical participants.
Dysfunctions in evaluating beliefs relative to those beliefs already
held by an individual may not in itself be a distinctive feature of
delusion formation. Comparisons of the degree to which the beliefs
of deluded and non-clinical individuals co-occur or otherwise
would however allow evaluation of whether any generic dysfunc-
tion in belief evaluation leading to a delusional belief, and/or the
selectiveness of this dysfunction, were important factors in the
formation or maintenance of pathological beliefs.
Some of the inconsistent beliefs may have arisen due to
differences in participants’ interpretation of the question asked,
e.g., believing in a certain kind of spirit capable of possession, but
thinking of this as distinct from demons, so being wary of
endorsing the demons/evil spirits question and not seeing the
inconsistency. Indeed, as it is not possible to fully determine how
participants interpreted each probe question, this may contribute
to some of the apparent discrepancies found in the present study.
This limitation, along with a need to replicate the co-occurrence
analysis in other sets of belief to ensure that the findings here are
not due to the particular selection of belief questions used, provides
a strong impetus for further studies in this area. Replication should
also include a set of different key belief pairings to further explore
reports of seemingly inconsistent beliefs.
It is also important to highlight that co-occurrence of belief
endorsement per se could be due to several factors in belief
development over and above high level coherence. This might
include reasoning biases, which might be expected to impact on
the types of beliefs likely to be held. For example, the presence of
anomalous experiences (e.g., seeing things) could lead to a number
of potentially related beliefs (e.g., in ghosts, spirits, magic, etc).
Another limitation is that we cannot identify whether the increased
co-occurrence within thematic groups indicates direct coherence
between two propositions, or whether this relationship is mediated
by one or more other beliefs (and this is likely to vary at the
individual level). Ultimately the validity of our conclusions rely on
the representativeness of the small sample of beliefs chosen to
evaluate each of the three categories.
In conclusion, the degree of belief co-endorsement revealed by
this preliminary analysis suggests that endorsing one belief in a
thematic group makes it more likely that the same person will
endorse another from the group. Although this finding is
supportive of ideas arguing for belief coherence, such as those
relating to both cognitive consonance [5] and the idea of a web of
belief [10], some associations were weaker than might be expected,
suggesting that cognitive dissonance (despite subjects not being
necessarily aware of same) may also be present. For example, the
association between believing in evolution and believing that
humans share a common ancestor with apes was relatively weak (w
,0.2) despite the considerable content overlap. The presence of
cognitively dissonant beliefs suggest that a strong consistency
requirement in defining Quine’s web where beliefs must tie in with
all other beliefs, may not be appropriate. While the scale and
nature of the items choosen study do not allow us to fully address
belief coherence, the results provide a first effort to quantify the
"coherence" with which particular beliefs can and are held in the
context of other beliefs.
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